28. Okt. 1997
But the strategic environment for which the Eurofighter was developed has altered fundamentally. It was designed to be remarkably agile, specialising in dog-fighting. These specifications were defined during the Cold War in the expectation of meeting massive air attacks from Warsaw Pact forces.
While defence cuts have led all the participating nations to reduce their Eurofighter orders to 232
planes for the UK, 180 for Germany, Italy 130 and Spain 87, delays and wrangles have led to the cost
of the programme spiralling dramatically from E20 billion to E42-5 billion.
For Britain, at an estimated E15 billion, the Eurofighter is the largest procurement programme the Ministry of Defence has ever committed itself to. At the peak of production early next century, it will take the lion's share of the procurement budget.
Germany's funding difficulties for & Eurofighter have not been resolv~d. A cabinet decision must be ratified by the Bundestag which will not address the issue until the last week of November and the Social Democrats and many of the Free Democrats are strongly opposed.
German prevarications have caused serious delays and technical problems. The first aircraft were planned to come off the line this year. But production still has not commenced and the in-service date has been put back to 2002.
By then, its specifications will be over 20 years old. It will have limited stealth capability, no thrust vectoring an important feature for evading incoming missiles - and an inability to cruise at supersonic speeds without its after burners on (to reduce fuel consumption and enhance stealthiness.)
In recognition of the limitations of the strategic role of the Eurofighter in any future low-intensity operations, the MOD has decided to add on an anti-armour missile, laser, guided bombs and air-to-surrface missiles. The likely net effect will be to impair its agility whilst elevating the aircraft to, at best, a secondclass workhorse in antisurface operations. Such compromise undermines the claim that Eurofighter represents the best that money can buy for the British air force.
Why then have successive UK governments stuck so resolutely to the Eurofighter programme? Cancellation would mean the loss of 15-20 per cent of the aerospace industry workforce: highly skilled high-tech jobs. There are 20,000 directly dependent on the project and another 20,000 indirectly. The losses would be devastating around Bristol, and Warton in Lancashire.
Critics, however, point out that, at P0.75 million per job, this is a very expensive jobcreation scheme. A properly empowered defence diversification agency needs to be established to help companies and local economies adjust to defence cutbacks.
In the not-too-distant future, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) built by Lockheed Martin with BAe as a collaborator, is likely to offer an affordable strike attack aircraft with many of the features that Eurofighter falls short on, such as stealth and thrust vectoring. It will be the most advanced strike aircraft in the world, able to operate in the dark with switched-off radar, able, to operate from limited airfields and aircraft carriers round the world, and adaptable to the different roles expected of air-power in the 21st century. The Pentagon has insisted its flyaway price be no more than $20 million - a third of the estimated - unit price of the Eurofighter.
Until the in-service date of the JSF, estimated in 2007, one option would be to lease F-16 aircraft from the US.
Otherwise, the RAF would have to consolidate as a force specialising in ground attack, transport, reconnaissance, AWACS, search-and-rescue and air refuelling. This may not be as glamorous as air combat, but it may provide greater assurance that the Service will continue to play a key role in any future international coalition force.
At present there is a danger that the hardware is determining the future roles of the RAF, rather than the other way round.
Susan Willett is a research associate at the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College,London.
